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arbitrators, but specialist arbitration institutions such as the 
ICC, the London Court of International Arbitration, the 
AAA or other institutions have considerable knowledge of 
suitable people to act as arbitrators, especially as they often 
make appointments.
(11) There are benefits to having a three-person tribunal 
although there are undoubtedly certain disadvantages.
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(12) In international matters, not only must an arbitrator be 
competent in his or her own jurisdiction but he or she 
should have an understanding of other systems of 
jurisprudence or of other legal systems.
I have set out what I believe to be most of the relevant factors 
in the selection of arbitrators and although much of what I have 
said might be regarded as counsels of perfection, the plain fact is 
that, for the most part, international arbitration and 
international arbitrators rightly deserve the high reputation that 
they have. This is in no small part due to the fact that there has 
been a correct selection of arbitrators. ™
David Winter ORE
Baker &^McKenzie
Myths surrounding the PFI 
in the UK
by Christopher Bovis
In this article the author endeavours to demonstrate the theoretical and 
practical background of some of the most important issues surrounding the 
PFI as part of the government's attempt to institutionalise governance by 
contract.
The PFI represents a process of public sector management which envisages the utilisation of private finances in the dispersement of public services and the provision of 
public infrastructure. The principal benefit from such an 
exercise could be that the public sector does not have to commit 
its own, often scarce, capital resources in delivering public 
services. Other reasons put forward for involving private 
finances in delivering public services include:
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  quality improvement,
  innovation,
  management efficiency and effectiveness, 
elements that are often underlying private sector 
entrepreneurship. Consequently, the public sector would receive 
value for money in the delivery of services to the public, whereas 
it could also be maintained that, through this process, the state 
manages public finances in a better way, to the extent that capital 
resources could be utilised in priority areas.
ROLE OF THE PFI
The PFI has arrived in times when the role and the 
responsibilities of the state are being redefined. Also, alongside 
the privatisation and contracting out processes, it has been seen 
as part of the exercise in slimming the state down to a bare 
minimum of fiscal responsibilities towards the public. The PFI 
has resulted in changing the traditional nature of the state with 
regard to asset ownership and the delivery of services to the
public. The state, under the PFI, assumes a regulatory role, 
whereas the private sector is elevated to asset owner and service 
deliverer.
There are two broad categories under which privately- 
financed projects can be classified.
Financially free-standing projects
The first covers the so-called financially free-standing projects, 
where it is expected that the private sector designs, builds, 
finances and then operates an asset. The recovery of its costs is 
guaranteed by direct charges on the users of the service which 
the particular asset provides. These projects are often described 
as concession contracts, where the successful contractor is granted 
an exclusive right over a period of time to exploit the asset that 
it has financed, designed and built. The state and its authorities 
may also contribute, in financial terms, to the repayments in 
order to render the project viable or the service charge to the 
end users acceptable.
Provision of services by the private sector
The second category of privately-financed projects embraces 
those which have as their object the provision of services by the 
private sector to the public, in conjunction with and subject to 
the relevant investment in assets that are necessary to deliver the 
required service to the public. In such cases, the private sector 
provider is reimbursed by a series of future payments by the
contracting authority, payments which depend upon the 
successful delivery of those services in accordance with certain 
specified quality standards.
EMERGENCE OF THE PFI
When the PFI was launched in 1992 by the Conservative 
administration, it did not receive the envisaged response from 
either the public or the private sectors. The initial approach to 
privately-financed projects by the public sector represented a 
disguised tendering for their financing and, as such, it revealed a 
number of procedural and commercial inadequacies in the 
whole process. Policy makers incorrectly assumed that the mere 
private financing of projects could enhance their quality and 
value for money, as well as transform the often ill-fated 
traditional public procurement process into a supply chain 
system of advanced structure and entrepreneurial flair. The PFI 
was wrongfully conceived as a panacea for the limitations of the 
traditional public procurement process, which was blamed for 
inefficiencies and poor value for money. A number of reasons 
which have been put forward include, inter alia, poor 
specification design, wrong contractual risk allocation, poor 
control systems for contractual performance and bad planning 
and delivery processes.
In principle, privately-financed projects destined for the 
public sector have been an option in the UK public procurement 
process since the eighties, where the government, with a great 
deal of caut'ion, allowed the conclusion of a limited number of 
contracts. The government applied the so-called Ryrie Rules in 
the process of allowing private finances to be used in public 
projects, subject to two strict conditions. The first concerned 
the cost-effective nature of the privately-financed delivery in 
comparison with a publicly-funded alternative. To reach such a 
conclusion, contracting authorities should have established a 
public sector comparator, whereby the privately-financed delivery 
model could be tested and compared against the traditional 
publicly-funded one. The second condition for the government 
to give clearance for a privately-financed project related to the 
compulsory substitution of publicly-funded schemes with the 
privately-funded ones. In other words, private finances were 
conceived as an exclusive alternative method in delivering public 
services, not as a complementary one.
Meeting the Ryrie conditions
Meeting the two conditions of the Ryrie Rules was not an easy 
exercise for public authorities, particularly in attempting to 
establish the cost-effective nature of a privately-financed project 
versus a publicly-funded alternative and its value for money. 
Quite often the rationale behind such comparisons was founded 
upon unsound grounds. For example, in order to achieve a 
meaningful comparison, the two delivery models should be 
benchmarked against a set of variable parameters (e.g. technical 
merit, quality of deliverables, aesthetic reasons, maintenance 
facilities, warranties and, last but not least, overall price). This 
was not always the case, as the specifications of the project were 
firmly predetermined from the outset by the public authority in 
question and the pricing of a project evolved around them. 
Hence the only variable parameter to compare the two delivery 
models unfolded around pricing. The procurement of privately- 
financed projects was a disguised tendering for their financing, 
and as such was bound to have very limited impact upon the
procurement process. There was little chance that the private 
sector could beat the privileged position governments enjoy in 
the financial markets and raise the capital required to finance a 
service or an infrastructure project in more preferable terms. 
Furthermore, the private sector would normally require extra 
levels of capital return for the deferred payment facility that the 
public sector would use for repayments during the life of the 
contract. In the light of the above considerations, it is not a 
surprise that only a handful of privately-financed projects were 
concluded, particularly complex projects of massive scale and of 
multi-national dimension.
Against this background and bearing in mind the recently 
imposed restraints on public expenditure, e.g. prudence in 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), EMU 
convergence criteria, the PFI was given a new lease of life when 
the 1997 Labour Government committed itself, in principle, to 
the concept and as a consequence, public authorities in the UK 
have been required to explore all potential ways of involving 
private finances in their public procurement process prior to 
committing their own funds.
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE PFI
The origins of the PFI could be traced in the attempts to 
moderate the widespread dissatisfaction from traditional public 
procurement methods. The nexus of contractual relations 
between public authorities and the private sector has been often 
criticised for not giving the best value for money. The criticism 
has been primarily directed towards three elements of the 
process:
(1) adversarial contractual relations as a result of compulsory 
competitive tendering;
(2) inefficient risk allocation; and
(3) poor contractual performances resulting in delayed and 
over-budgeted completions.
PFI versus competitive tendering
Competitive tendering in public procurement has been 
reproached for creating a confrontational environment, where 
the antagonising relations which emanate from the tendering 
and contract award processes are often reflected in the 
performance stage of the contract. Public procurement 
procedures which are based upon a win-to-win process have 
been deemed to deprive significant elements one can expect in 
the delivery of public services. For example, competitive 
tendering has been dissociated from innovation and quality. Also, 
as a result of inefficiently written specifications upon which the 
tender should be constructed, the deliverables often differ 
dramatically from contractual expectations.
On the other hand, risk allocation is probably the most crucial 
element in contractual relations that affects pricing as well as the 
overall contractual framework. Risk represents the level of 
financial exposure of a party prior to, after the conclusion of a 
contract or during its performance. In traditional public 
procurement, the risk allocation tends to favour the supply side, 
which mainly assumes the risks related to the tendering process. 
During the performance stage of the contract and up to its 
completion, the demand side could usually shift a considerable 
amount of risk, by requesting from the supply side performance 
or defects bonds, or other means of financial guarantees.
Finally, traditional procurement methods have often revealed 
a picture of poor contracts management as a result of inefficient 
control systems operated by public authorities. Poor contracts 
management has resulted in abysmally out-of-control 
contractual performances with all the financial consequences 
attributed to the delayed completions of the projects.
Competitive tendering, amongst other things, has been 
deemed responsible for cyclical demand structures in public 
purchasing, a situation where the supply side (the industry) 
responds to the demand side (public authorities) through cycles 
of institutionalised bureaucracy (tender submission, selection, 
evaluation and contract award processes). The demand side has 
institutionalised the procurement process by imposing a 
disciplinarian compartmentalisation of the relevant processes 
(advertisement, expression of interest, selection, qualification, 
tender, contract award).
The institutionalisation of the procurement process intends to 
facilitate the main objectives of the European public 
procurement rules:
  the establishment of the principles of transparency and 
competitiveness in the award of public contracts; and
  the achievement of savings for the public sector.
The bureaucratic system which supports traditional public 
procurement uses the effects of transparency as leverage for 
value for money results. The fact that more suppliers are aware 
of a forthcoming public contract and the fact that interested 
suppliers are aware that their rivals are informed about it, 
indicates two distinctive parameters which are relevant to savings 
and value for money:
  focus on value for money for the demand side and the 
possibility for contracting authorities to compare prices and 
quality;
  effect on the suppliers who, inter alia, can no longer rely on 
lack of price comparisons when serving the public sector. 
Openness in public procurement, by definition, results in 
price competition and the benefits for contracting authorities 
appear achievable. The institutionalised nature of the public side 
of the procurement process also reflects the relative balance of 
powers in the demand/supply equation. However, the traditional 
public procurement process often suffers from unnecessarily 
repetitive functions (in particular the advertisement, selection 
and qualification processes) which can be cost ineffective and 
pose a considerable financial burden on the demand side.
Against this background, the PFI was originally construed as 
the process that could bring the public and private sectors closer 
and break the mistrust which has surrounded traditional public 
procurement. The PFI should not be conceived as a capital 
facility to the state and its organs in the process of delivering 
public services. It should not been seen as a borrowing exercise1 o
by the public sector, as the latter can acquire capital in much 
more preferential terms than any private person. The PFI should 
rather be conceived as a process of involving the private sector in 
the delivery of public services. As such, the PFI attempts to 
introduce a contractual element in the delivery of public 
services, to the extent that the private sector, as a contractual 
party, undertakes the responsibility to provide not only an asset 
but to deliver its associated functions to the public. Therefore, 
the PFI has contributed to changing the traditionally 
acquisitorial nature of public sector contracts by inserting a 
service delivery element.
PFI versus PSBR
One of the most important attractions of the PFI has been the 
ability of public authorities to classify the relevant transactions as 
exempted from the PSBR, thus by-passing centrally controlled 
budgetary allocations and cash limits in the public sector 
spending. In such a way, the PFI represented a viable solution to 
cash-stranded public authorities which could, independently, 
proceed and strike deals that otherwise would not have 
materialised. Furthermore, the public spending relating to the 
repayments of the privately-financed transactions would not 
appear as public debt. By taking privately-financed transactions 
out of the PSBR balance sheet, the government may implicitly 
have attempted to liberalise public purchasing from budgetary 
constraints and public spending capping. It could be also argued 
that such an attempt could indicate the beginning of the end to 
the institutionalised decision-making process and control of 
public procurement imposed under the European (and 
domestic) public procurement regime.
The paramount implication of not classifying privately- 
financed projects as public debt could be that such purchasing 
would not fall under the annual comprehensive spending review 
of the government. In fact, non-inclusion of PFI deals in the 
PSBR could transform the structure of public markets by 
reversing the roles and the relative importance of the demand 
and supply sides. Indeed, it was originally suggested that the 
private sector should initiate demand by exploring the overall 
potential and delivery options and then introducing the plan to 
the relevant public authority. Such a scenario could also mean 
the dismantling of public markets and the elevation of private 
markets as the forum for the pursuit of public interest.
However, the practice not to include PFI projects in the PSBR 
balance sheet and the assumption that the relevant spending 
does not represent public debt were often described as legal and 
policy acrobatisms. The Public Accounts Parliamentary 
Committee and the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) took 
different views with HM Treasury over the issue of excluding PFI 
deals from the PSBR. In its December 1997 report, the ASB 
came out in favour of including PFI projects in the PSBR, 
although the Treasury, backed by the National Audit Office and 
the Audit Commission had issued guidelines to the contrary.
A serious set back for the PFI in the UK was the report of the 
ASB (The Tweedie Report, September 1998) which criticised the 
practice of the Treasury of not including PFI deals in the PSBR 
balance sheet. The report condemned such practices and urged 
the government, for the sake of legal certainty and good public 
sector management and accounting, to issue new guidelines for 
future PFI projects and treat them in the same way as traditional 
public procurement spending.
PROCEDURAL DELIVERY
Privately-financed projects have two constituent elements 
which are prerequisites for their successful completion:
(1) a genuine allocation of contractual risk; and
(2) value for money for the public sector.
The first element represents the integral balance of 
contractual relationships. Rightly or wrongly, under traditional 
public procurement transactions there is a widespread 
assumption that contractual relationships are based upon a
disproportionate risk allocation amongst the parties. Although in 
traditional public procurement systems the demand side appears 
the dominant part in the equation, when it comes to risk 
allocation, the roles appear reversed. Risk allocation is a much- 
misunderstood concept in contractual relationships in general, 
but particularly in public purchasing transactions, it has never 
been properly addressed. Normally, in a public contract, risk 
assessment includes contractual elements which are associated 
with the design or construction of a project, the required 
investment and financing, planning and operational matters, 
maintenance, residualisation, obsolescence, political/legal 
aspects, industrial relations, usage volumes and, finally, currency 
transactions. Risk allocation is the result of negotiations between 
the parties and is normally expected to reflect the pricing 
element of contractual arrangements between them. Thus, risk 
and pricing operate in an analogous relation within a contract. 
The more risk a party assumes, the higher the price to be paid 
by the other party, and vice versa.
In traditional public procurement transactions the demand 
side inevitably undertakes too much risk as a result of its 
practices. The award of publicly-funded contracts takes place 
predominately by reference to the lowest price, which constitutes 
one of the two permissible award criteria under the 
procurement rules (the other being the criterion of the most 
economically advantageous offer). When contracting authorities 
award their contracts by reference to pricing, this would 
normally reflect the amount of risk they are prepared to assume.
There is no golden rule as to what represents an acceptable 
risk transfer in a contract, the latter being private or public, for 
risk allocation primarily reflects the parties' perception of a 
transaction with reference to their own criteria. These criteria 
are often influenced by a range of parameters such as 
speculation, fear, certainty, as well as by a number of qualitative 
attributes of the parties, e.g. sound forecast and planning, 
market intelligence.
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On the other hand, value for money as the second constituent 
element of a privately-financed project should reflect a 
benchmarked comparison between public and privately- 
financed models of service delivery. The comparison should not 
only take into account factors such as quality or technical merit, 
but mainly aspects of sound supply chain management reflecting 
efficiency gains, in the sense that the conclusion of a privately- 
financed project would resemble to a large extent a contractual 
arrangement between private parties. Value for money as an 
element in a PFI deal is a precursor of best purchasing practice 
by contracting authorities and also reflects the underlying 
competitive elements which are necessary in order to meet the
accountability and transparency standards and principles. In its 
policy statement Public Sector Comparators and Value Jor Money, 
February 1998, the HM Treasury Taskforce has set out the role 
of comparators in public procurement, stressing the importance 
of the value for money principle. The comparators are indices 
which help to distinguish between the lowest cost and the best 
value for money for public authorities and also their use as an 
exercise of financial management and a means of demonstrating 
savings to public authorities.
EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
DIRECTIVES
The PFI is proclaimed to be an evolution in the public sector 
management and a step forward in achieving real value for 
money in public purchasing. Numerous guidance notes have 
been issued by government departments in an attempt to 
provide for a framework of smooth procedural delivery. 
However, a number of difficult issues arise when a privately- 
financed contract is examined under the spectrum of the 
European public procurement directives. Notwithstanding the 
fact that a PFI project is privately-financed, it will be paid for 
from public funds, thus compliance with the European public 
procurement rules is of paramount importance. It would be 
naive for contracting authorities to ignore the spirit and the 
wording of the directives. It could also be embarrassing for them
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if litigation before domestic courts or the European Court of 
Justice concerning the award procedures of a privately-financed 
project is initiated. Clearly, there is a great deal of uncertainty in 
relation to the compatibility of the European public 
procurement rules and the PFI. The situation has not yet been 
clarified by the European Commission, which seems to sit in the 
background waiting for the domestic government to determine 
any issues of compatibility.
It appears that three major issues in a privately-financed 
project may cause considerable friction between the European 
Commission and contracting authorities. The first relates to the 
contractual nature of the privately-financed transaction, when 
viewed through the spectrum of the European public 
procurement directives. A privately-financed project can be 
classified as a 'public services contract' or as a 'public works 
contract' depending upon the nature of the deliverables. It could 
also be considered as a 'mixed contract', where both services 
and construction work are parts of the project. Finally, it can be 
characterised as a 'concession contract'. The contractual nature 
of a PFI project is crucial in its procedural delivery and 
detrimental in complying with the relevant European 
procurement rules, as it triggers the applicability of different 
directives and requirements stipulated therein.
The second issue is concerned with the process of contract 
award and, in particular the type of procedures that contracting 
authorities may use in order to concluded a privately-financed 
project. When contracting authorities award PFI projects 
classified as public works or public services contracts, they have 
been urged to have recourse to negotiated procedures. The 
official line adopted is that a privately-financed project could 
meet all the conditions imposed by the European public 
procurement rules for allowing the negotiated procedures to be 
used in contract awards and form a sort of precedent for future 
projects. However, it should be pointed out that the European 
institutions never looked favourably at the use of negotiated
procedures by contracting authorities. The European Court of 
Justice has always been very reluctant in accepting the use of 
negotiated procedures, particularly without prior advertisement, 
and has always maintained their exceptional character.
Finally, the third issue revolves around publicity requirements. 
The European public procurement directives have established a 
regime which, inter alia, provides a mechanism for all the 
information needed to be made available to the relevant parties 
or the public in relation to the award of public contracts. 
Contracting authorities are under explicit obligation to furnish a 
range of information on their own initiative or upon request. 
This obligation is, in principle, extended to all PFI projects that 
are awarded under the procurement rules. However, practice 
has shown that very little information concerning the award of a 
PFI contract sees the light of publicity, often being described as 
'commercially confidential'. The proposed Freedom of 
Information Act in the UK has implications for the publicity of 
PFI contracts, implications which mirror the obligations of
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contracting authorities stipulated in the public procurement 
directives. An exemption for confidentially commercial 
information will apply, provided substantial harm to a party can be 
demonstrated.
CONCLUSION
The PFI represents a genuine attempt to introduce the 
concept of contractualised governance in the delivery of public 
services. The PFI can be described as an institutionalised 
mechanism in engaging the private sector in the delivery of 
public services, not only through the financing but mainly 
through the operation of assets. The private sector assumes a 
direct responsibility in serving the public interest, as part of its 
contractual obligations vis-a-vis the public sector. The motive 
and the intention behind such an approach focus on the benefits 
which would follow as a result of the private sector's involvement 
in the delivery «f public services. Efficiency gains, qualitative 
improvement, innovation, value for money and flexibility appear 
as the most important ones, whereas an overall better allocation 
of public capital resources sums up the advantages of privately- 
financed projects.
The PFI brings an end to the notion of public ownership and 
instead introduces the concept of service delivery in the relevant 
contractual relationship between private and public sectors. The 
private sector is no longer a contractor to the public sector but 
rather a partner. It seems that there is a quasi-agency 
relationship between the private and public sectors, in the sense
that the former provides the relevant infrastructure and in fact 
delivers public services on behalf of the latter.
The PFI should be delivered through a system that guarantees 
accountability, openness and competitiveness. Such a system for 
the dispersement of public services is encapsulated in the 
European public procurement regime, which is expected to be 
the most appropriate delivery process for the PFI. The European 
public procurement directives provide for a disciplined, 
transparent and relatively swift system for the award of public 
contracts. One the most notorious features of the existing PFI 
delivery process is the abysmally lengthy negotiation stage and 
the prolonged pre-contractual arrangements. The average PFI 
gestation period is 18 months compared with two months in 
traditional public procurement contracts.
What remains is the development of comprehensive 
guidelines for the deployment of private finances in the delivery 
of public services and the embedment of relevant legislation that 
empowers public authorities to contractualise their governance. 
Prior to 1997 there was considerable uncertainty as to the legal 
position of the parties to a privately-financed project. The 
relevant legislation did not provide in concrete for the rights and 
obligations of the private sector and threatened with ultra vires 
agreements concluded between certain public authorities (local 
authorities and health trusts) and the private sector. It was 
unclear whether these authorities had explicit or implied powers 
to enter into such contracts, a situation which left privately- 
financed transactions in limbo. As a consequence, the National 
Health Service (Private Finance) Act 1997 and the Local Government 
Act (Contracts) 1997 have been enacted in order to clear all legal 
obstacles. Both acts have introduced a 'clearance system' where 
the relevant authorities must certify a prospective PFI deal with 
the government, checking not only its vires but the whole 
commercial viability and procedural delivery mechanism of a 
privately-financed contract.
The PFI as a concept of public sector management has, in 
theory, a promising future. In reality, it should be benchmarked 
against traditional publicly-funded systems, both in qualitative 
and quantitative terms. Only then can one assess with reasonable 
confidence its merits and its impact upon the dispersement of 
public services. ™
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